Abstract
Long-term operation of nuclear power plants is usually discussed as a technical and regulatory challenge. The main attention is given to equipment aging, maintenance programs, modernization, inspections, licensing requirements, and the continued reliability of safety systems. These issues are essential. However, they do not fully describe what makes long-term nuclear operation safe.
This article examines long-term operation from the perspective of human factors and safety culture. It argues that the extended service life of a nuclear facility depends not only on the physical condition of equipment but also on the preservation of professional knowledge, organizational memory, workforce competence, and trust within the operating environment. Technical systems can be inspected, repaired, and modernized. Human and organizational capabilities require a different kind of attention.
Drawing on more than seventeen years of professional experience at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the article focuses on the practical relationship between technical reliability and the professional community responsible for maintaining it. It challenges the view that long-term operation can be assessed primarily through engineering indicators. In mature nuclear facilities, much of operational safety depends on accumulated experience, informal knowledge transfer, disciplined communication, and the ability of personnel to recognize weak signals before they become visible failures.
The article proposes a human-centered approach to long-term nuclear operation. It suggests that workforce resilience, knowledge retention, and safety culture should be treated as core elements of long-term safety assessment rather than as secondary organizational concerns.
Keywords:
Nuclear Safety; Human Factors; Safety Culture; Long-Term Operation; Knowledge Retention; Organizational Memory; Workforce Resilience; Nuclear Power Plants; Technical Reliability; Operational Safety
Author:
Dmytro Kucheruk
Independent Researcher
ORCID: 0009-0009-9179-9500
DOI: pending
Full Text (PDF)
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