Abstract
Human factors research in the nuclear industry has traditionally focused on two operational contexts: routine plant operation and emergency response. Routine conditions are characterized by established procedures, stable organizational structures, and predictable decision-making processes. Emergency situations, by contrast, require rapid actions under exceptional circumstances and have therefore received considerable attention in both operational guidance and academic research.
Between these two conditions lies a broader category of operational situations that has received comparatively limited conceptual attention. Nuclear facilities may continue operating safely while simultaneously experiencing prolonged organizational, technical, or environmental changes that alter normal patterns of decision-making, communication, workload, and professional interaction. These conditions do not necessarily constitute emergencies, yet they cannot be fully understood within models developed for routine operation.
This article argues that such circumstances should be recognized as non-routine nuclear operations. Rather than representing isolated events, they constitute a distinct operational environment in which existing technical systems remain functional while human and organizational processes are required to adapt to sustained uncertainty and changing operational demands.
Drawing upon more than seventeen years of professional experience at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, this article examines how communication, professional judgment, organizational learning, and workforce resilience evolve under non-routine operating conditions. It argues that resilience should not be understood solely as the capacity to recover from accidents but also as the ability of organizations to sustain safe performance while adapting to prolonged departures from routine operations.
The article proposes a conceptual framework that positions non-routine nuclear operations as an intermediate operational domain between normal plant operation and emergency response. Recognizing this domain provides a broader understanding of human factors and offers new perspectives for strengthening organizational resilience in long-term nuclear safety.
Keywords:
Human Factors; Nuclear Power Plants; Non-Routine Operations; Organizational Resilience; Safety Culture; Organizational Learning; Workforce Resilience; Professional Judgment; Human Performance; Knowledge Retention; Organizational Memory; Nuclear Safety
Author:
Dmytro Kucheruk
Independent Researcher
ORCID: 0009-0009-9179-9500
DOI: pending
Full Text (PDF)
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